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This business research project studies the feasibility of
secondary mortgage business in Hong Kong and suggests as
the research findings some recommended actions to rectify
the current inadequacies of the market structure.
The study starts with a general literature survey of the
characteristics and features of the mortgage-backed
instruments in the United States. The economic functions,
the historical performance and the reasons for the success
of the mortgage-backed instruments are examined. This then
forms the basis for the detailed study of the Hong Kong
situation.
The study of the Hong Kong market takes the form of an
exploratory research. Two phases of interviews have been
structured so as to identify the prospective market
undertakers and to collect the relevant information.
The report starts with a general description of the
primary mortgage market and then outlines the secondary
mortgage activities in Hong Kong. The potential of a full
scale development of the secondary mortgage market has
been found to be critically dependent on the interests and
the internal pressures of local mortgage bankers. As such,
a forecast of the mortgage lending pressures on banks has
been conducted and has found to be continuously increasing
over the next 10 years. The use of mortgage-backed
instruments seem very likely to solve the internal control
problem of bankers over the forthcoming period of high
growth of the primary mortgage market.
However, the study has found that the local capital market
may be too fragile for the inception of mortgage-backed
instruments. Technical impediments are found to be many
but when the pressures induce sufficient impetus, these
impediments are surmountable.
As a summary of the research findings, the report has
depicted the following six recommendations:-
The mortgage-backed instrument will take the form of1)
floating-rate note.
2) Indemnity policy will provide the necessary guarantee.
3) Homogeneity of the mortgage pool should be observed.
4 The securities will take the form of private
placements under the present market structure.
Some of the legal complexities should be resolved.5
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Although the property market suffered several downturns in
the past, it remains one of the leading businesses in Hong
Kong. With its extensive commercial and residential
undertakings, the mortgage market is a huge debt market in
the Territories. According to the Government Statistics,
the mortgage loans outstanding only for purchasing of
private residential properties, Home Ownership Scheme
(HOS) and Private Sector Participation Scheme flats have
already reached a record level of more than HK$62 billion
as at September, 1987. However, in terms of the basic
concept,. it can be said that most of the financial
institutions in Hong Kong are engaged in the primary
mortgage business. That is, they extend funds directly to
mortgage borrowers through the processes of origination,
processing, underwriting, servicing and marketing of the
loan. Most important of all, they hold them to maturity.
(1) However, as will be shown in later Chapters,
continuing growth of the home mortgage business may
inevitably favor those banks with large deposit bases
2while posing difficulties to those foreign banks and small
local banks which have no cheap source of funds. In order
to enhance their competitiveness in residential mortgage
lending, the secondary mortgage business may be one of
their alternatives.
The secondary mortgage business may be defined as the
trading of mortgage loans among financial institutions or
other investors after being originated by primary lenders
while the secondary mortgage market will be the
marketplace for such activities. (2) In general, the
forms of transaction in the market are numerous. It can be
a "whole loan" sale transaction, or it can be in the form
of a capital market instrument backed by mortgages. The
concept behind these instruments is the securitization of
a pool of mortgage loans, while the mechanism of
securitization can be done in two different ways from the
issuer's point of view. one is the sale structure and the
other is the debt structure. (3)
(1) This definition is adapted from "Primary Vs.
Secondary", Residential Mortgage Lending, Chapter 9,
p.130.
(2) This definition is adapted from "A Description of the
Secondary Mortgage Market", Handbook of Financial
Markets: Securities, Options, Futures, Chapter 18,
p.408.
(3) "Bankers Debate....Is Asset Securitization Worth the
Cost At Your Bank?", The Journal of Commercial Bank
Lendinq, Auqust 1987, p.8
3Under the sale structure scenario, the issuer creates a
mortgage-backed pass-through certificate which stipulates
a pro rata ownership of the underlying mortgage pool by
the investor. That is, the investor assumes an equity
position towards the mortgage pool. This implies that the
mortgages are sold outright to the investors while the
issuer, after removing the mortgage loan assets off the
balance sheet, has no obligation towards the repayment of
mortgages in the pool. However, the issuer.. is still
responsible for the servicing of the mortgages and the
securities.
Under the debt structure scenario, the issuer creates
mortgage-backed notes or bonds which do not give investors
any pro rata ownership of the mortgage pool. In other
words, the payment of interest of the notes to the
investors will still be the obligation of the issuer while
the mortgages only serve as collateral for the notes.
Therefore, the investors will assume a creditor position
to the issuer in thiscase instead of equity status of the
pool.
For both the sale and debt structures, the certificate
holders will enjoy a fixed income at low default risk.
Besides, the investors may, at their discretion, hold the
securities to maturity or trade them in the secondary
market for capital gains. Owing to this similarity and
for the sake of consistency, the name mortgage-backed
4securities (MBS) will be used throughout this researcn
report to address both the sale and debt types of
securities.
In the United States, there are numerous forms of MBS
issued and it is estimated that about 50% of current
origination of mortgage lending is financed through
secondary mortgage business activities. (4) Therefore,
there must be some underlying factors and functions that
contribute to its attractiveness and success. On the
other hand, there may be some factors that would hinder
the consideration of the secondary mortgage business. In
fact, this is especially the picture in Hong Kong as the
local capital market is still perceived as being in a
infant stage. For instance, the local bond trading
activity is rather stagnant which may imply that there
will be roadblocks impeding the securitization of mortgage
loans. In order to study the feasibility of transferring
this financial technology to Hong Kong, attention will
be focused on the local financial environment so as to
determine whether MBS would also be appropriate for sale
to the domestic financial community.
(4) Growth of Residential Lending, Residential Mortgage
Lending, Chapter 9, p.130
51.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this research is to investigate
the feasibility of doing secondary mortgage business with
the existing residential mortgages in Hong Kong. There are
two major reasons for choosing only the residential
mortgages as basis for the secondary mortgage business
consideration in this research. First, the amount of home
mortgages outstanding in Hong Kong is already of
substantial size for any secondary mortgage market
activities. Therefore, in view of the limited time and
resources available, it is desirable only to address the
primary residential mortgage market. Secondly, the less
risky nature and the greater homogeneity of the home
mortgage business as compared with that of the commercial
and industrial sectors will facilitate the consideration
of the secondary mortgage business. In order to arrive at
the relevant recommendations and conclusions, the
following secondary research objectives are identified:
1) To review the mortgage-backed instruments in the
United States and their recent trends of development.
Specifically, the factors that lead to their success
and their associated economic functions will be
analyzed.
62) To study the residential mortgage market and its
activities in Hong Kong.
3) To survey the recent development of secondary mortgage
transactions in Hong Kong.
4) To analyze the mortgage lending pressures on financial
institutions in Hong Kong.
5) To identify the prospective issuers with special
attention to the technical considerations and
marketability of MBS in Hong Kong.
7CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As the concept of a secondary mortgage business is
somewhat new in Hong Kong, the potential research
respondents may not be too familiar with the details.
There is no comprehensive knowledge with specific
relevance to Hong Kong. In view of these restrictions,
this research project should therefore be mainly an
exploratory one. Probability sampling and questionnaire
techniques are not appropriate for the purposes. Most of
all, attitudes rating and simple 'yes or no' answers will
not be informative enough. Instead, non-probability
sampling has been adopted for the necessary primary data
collection. The target interviews are to be designed
following a preliminary phase of study. Subsequent phases
are structured in such a way so as to maximize and to
further explore the findings in the preliminary phase.
8The following phases for data collection have been adopted
2.1 Phase I- Secondary data collection
This is mainly the stage of rudimentary understanding of
the secondary mortgage concept and terminologies. The
information is obtained mainly from sources in Handbooks
and Manuals of the Dow Jones-Irwin Series, references on
real estate financing, and business periodicals. The
limitation in this phase is the lack of relevant
information about the Hong Kong market.
2.2 Phase II Preliminary interviews
Having completed the phase I study, it is time to search
in the Hong Kong environment to find what are the relevant
emphasizes of the study. This phase II study will
facilitate the design of the final in-depth detail led
study. Knowledgeable people in various fields are randomly
selected, and they are requested to give their opinions
and ideas in any form they like. The following people have
been contacted:
Mr. Richard Wong, V.P., Bond Division of Paribas Asia
Limited.
Mr. Daniel Leung, A.V.P., Morgan Bank.
Mr. Horace Ho, Financial Analyst, First Pacific Bank..
Miss Rosanna Chang, Personal Financial Consultant,
9Standard Chartered Bank.
Staff members in the Money 87 Exhibition
2.3 Phase III In-depth interviews
Following the general ideas formulated in phase II, the
main sources of primary data are located and broadly
summarized into the following categories:
1) Mortgage bankers
There are altogether four in-depth interviews with
different kinds of banking groups. They are generally
segmented into the following groups according to the
origin of their funds:
a local based leading large bank such as the Hong
Kong Bank Group
a large foreign bank such as Citibank
a small local Chinese bank such as the Bank of East
Asia
the China Bank Group
This group of interviews serves both as the sources of'
information for the primary mortgage activities as
well as for the potential of the secondary mortgage
business. With the exception of the China Bank Group,
successful interviews were held with the followings:
Mr. Roy C Dewar, Manager, Credit Retail Banking
Division, Standard Chartered Bank
A major local based bank with heavy mortgage
10
exposure (name not to be disclosed as requestea)
Mr. Leung Hoi-kwok, Chief Economist, Bank of East
Asia, Limited
Mr. Edmond Ho, Managing Director, Mrs. Fanny Lee,
Manager, CitiCorp Commercial Finance
2) Investment bankers
This group of interviews provided the source of
information on the existing capital market activities.
They are mainly the potential undertakers of possible
secondary mortgage business. Successful interviews
were held with:
Mr. K. L. Wong, Head of Primary Markets, Standard
Chartered Asia Limited
Mr. John V. S. Shi, Senior Manager, Domestic
Corporate Banking Division, Banque Indosuez
Mr. Paul Cheung, Director, Mr. Tony Li, Manager,
Jardine Fleming Co., Limited
3) Other interested parties
This group of interviews provided information for
identifying some special mortgage activities in Hong
Kong. They include:
Mr. David Lloyd, Vice President, Merrill Lynch,
Investment Banking
Mr. Anthony P. Gregory, Government Securities
Trader, W. S. Mooney's Securities (H.K.) Limited
11
Mr. Frankie Y. L. Wong, Executive Director, Shui On
Group Limited
Mr. T. K. Ghose, Principal Lecturer, Hong Kong
Polytechnic
Mr. W. L. Chan, Manager, The Hong Kong Building and
Loan Agency Limited
2.4 Problems encounterea
The following problems were encountered during the course
of the study:
1) Most of the literature available was based on the
circumstances in the United States and therefore would
not be directly adaptable to the Hong Kong situation.
2) Some of the primary data sources were not cooperative
enough in disclosing their business information.
3) Some of the interviewees were not familiar with the
secondary mortgage concept. They simply voiced
opinions that would make them appear more conversant
and thus bias the effectiveness of the primary data
collection.
4) The adoption of in-depth interviews instead of using a
large probability sample has resulted in a lack of
statistical inference. The information thus obtained
could be subjective and could contain unknown errors.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of an exploratory
research, this would be tolerable.
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CHAPTER 3
AN OVERVIEW OF MORTGAGE BACKED INSTRUMENTS
Before it is possible to focus attention on the mortgage
market in Hong Kong, it is worth discussing the underlying
concepts of mortgage-backed instruments in this chapter
because they are rather novel ideas in the local
environment. As the United States is the founder of
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the secondary mortgage
market in the U.S. will be an appropriate start for the
discussion. Afterwards, the two different forms of the
instruments and their economic functions in the U.S.
context will be elaborated. Following this will be a
description of the common types of MBS in the U.S. and
their historical performance. Finally a summary section
will be given as an ending to this chapter.
3.1 MORTGAGE MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES
At year-end 1978, the total amount of mortgages
outstanding was reported at US$1.25 trillion, which
represented 38 percent of the total debt in the U.S.. (1)
Besides being the largest debt market, it is also a
hi'ah Growth market.
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By the end of 1983, only the one-to-tour tamely mortgage
debt had already reached US$1.24 trillion. (2) However,
due to various economic factors, such as fiscal and
monetary policies, economic performance and inflation, the
volatility of this business is substantial. As can be
shown from historical figures, the year-to-year percentage
increase in residential mortgage loans outstanding ranged
from 6.5 percent to 17.3 percent in the 1970s. (3)
This volatility, together with the fact that the United
States is a geographically extensive and economically
scattered country, implies that there should be more
effective and efficient funding for mortgages other than
the conventional thrift deposits. However, in addition to
this volatility, the inherited complexities and problems
of reinvestment uncertainty in mortgage lending discourage
most of the institutional investors from participating so
long as they have lots of investment alternatives in the
capital market. Therefore, in order to make mortgage
(1) U.S. Credit Market Debt Outstanding Year-End 1966-
1978, Handbook of Financial Markets: Securities,
Options, Futures, Chapter 18, p.400
(2) Holders of One-to four-family mortgage debt
outstanding at the end of 1983, Residential Mortgage
Lending, Chapter 2, p.31
(3) Residential Mortgage Loans Outstanding and Annual
Increase, Handbook of Financial Markets: Securities,
Options, Futures, Chapter 18, p.406
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lending an attractive investment vehicle for the
investors, the secondary mortgage market and the trading
of mortgage-backed instruments were subsequently developed
in the 1970s. These instruments were able to attract the
traditional non-mortgage investors like pension funds,
trusts and insurance companies. As a result, the
secondary market was able to cater to the funding for the
rapid growth of the U.S. mortgage business in addition to
the traditional sources of funds from savings deposits.
In fact, the practice of selling mortgage loans to
mortgage investors had already been done by the
traditional mortgage bankers in the United States long
before the spectacular growth of the secondary mortgage
market. These mortgage bankers act as intermediaries in
originating and servicing the mortgage loans but they have
no intention of holding them to maturity. However, this
practice itself did not foster the rapid growth of the
secondary mortgage market because of the inherited legal
complications and illiquidity.
As it has been mentioned in the Introductory Section,
there are two categories of mortgage-backed securities in
the United States. One is the pass-through securities in
which the issuers assume a sale structure and the
investors assume an equity position. The other is the
15
mortgage-backed bonds in which the issuers take a debt
structure while the investors take a creditor position. In
the 1970s, a significant portion of the residential
mortgage loans outstanding in the United States were fixed
rate, which facilitated the mechanism of pass-through..
Also, because of the extensive support from the U.S.
Government mainly on pass-through securities, the existing
mortgage-backed securities in the secondary mortgage
market are chiefly pass-through securities. On the other
hand, the backed bonds are limited to private issues
only.
3.2 ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
IN THE U.S.
The U.S. Government has been playing a very crucial role
in the secondary mortgage market by granting full support
to certain pass-through securities. To analyze the
reasons for such a commitment from the Federal Government
in the market, it will be necessary to look at the
responsibility of such a secondary market in the society.
In fact, this market is of paramount importance to the
U.S. economy by virtue of its economic functions.
1) Provide the necessary liquidity
Because of the presence in an active secondary
mortgage market, each player in the market, including
16
originators, issuers and investors, can do
transactions on mortgage debts in the market any time
they like. This liquidity provides a solution to the
problem of uncertain flow of capital such as deposit
withdrawals or other demands faced by a financial
institution. Now they can easily alter their
mortgage holding positions in the ready secondary
market.
2) Moderate the volatility of mortgage capital flow
Due to the cyclical nature of the real estate market
in the U.S. economy, the flow of capital for mortgage
loans also fluctuates. This volatility is further
magnified when there is a shortage of capital.
Fortunately, the operation of the secondary mortgage
market widens the base of funds for mortgage loans by
acting as a linkage between the primary mortgage market
and the capital market with MBS in between as the vehicle.
3) Direct funds from capital surplus areas to capital
deficit areas
The United States is a geographically extensive
country and there exist many areas where the demand
for mortgage credit is greater than the corresponding
supply of capital, while the reverse may occur in
17
other locations. However, the secondary mortgage
market, besides acting as an implicit linkage, also
forms a geographical bridge for capital flow in the
U.S. by virtue of its national scale.
4) Direct capital for mortgage loans from international
capital markets
Besides being popular in the U.S. domestic capital
market, the mortgage-backed instruments also attract
investors from other parts of the world. In fact,
these MBS are now available in other international
financial centers like London, Tokyo and Hong Kong.
Their virtually risk-free nature and competitive
returns as against other capital market instruments
enable the U.S. to tap funds for mortgage lending from
overseas. Hence, the overall availability of mortgage
capital in the U.S. is enlarged by the presence of
such an international sourcing network.
5) Reduce the geographical difference in interest rates
In the United States, there exists the phenomenon of a
difference in interest rates in different geographical
areas. However, through the operation of the
secondary mortgage market, the mobility of capital-for
mortgages to areas of high interest rates moderates
the mortgage rate differentials in the country. Thus
this brings benefits to the home end-users in hiqh
18
interest rate areas by offering them lower mortgage
rates.
3.3 TYPES OF MORTGAGE-BACKED INSTRUMENTS IN THE U.S.
Apart from the sale and debt structures, mortgage-bacxea
securities can be classified into two main categories.
One is the MBS issued or sponsored by government or
government-related agencies. This category comprises the
main part of the U.S. secondary mortgage market. The
active participants under this category are the Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae), the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie
Mae) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA
or Fannie Mae). The mortgage-backed instruments they
issued are chiefly pass-through securities and there are
totally more than ten different types of them with
different characteristics. In this section, only the
representative type of each corresponding agency will be
described. Another category which is small in volume but
is undergoing rapid development is the mortgage-backed
instruments issued by private financial institutions such
as commercial banks, savings and loans associations, etc..
Under this sector, there are both pass-through securities
and backed bonds representing the sale and debt positions
of the issuers respectively.
1) Government National Mortgage Association Pass-Through
Securities
19
Under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,
FNMA was split into two independent entities, namely
the GNMA and the new FNMA. GNMA, as a follow-up of
the old FNMA, is a wholly owned U.S. Government
corporation under the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). On behalf of the U.S. Government
and being backed by its full faith and credit (4),
GNMA gives its guarantee to a pool of FHA-insured or
VA-guaranteed mortgages which will then be securitized
by approved institutions. Of the approximately 500
authorized issuers, mortgage bankers have already
accounted for about 90 percent while the remaining are
mainly thrift institutions. When the securities pass
to the investors either through direct purchase or
through a dealer, each investor will be secured, not
only by the pledged mortgages, but also by the GNMA
guarantee of the timely payment of his monthly prorata
share of principal and interest. In return for the
government guarantee, GNMA will receive six basis
points as an insurance fee out of the 50 basis points
reduction from the mortgage rate, while the other 44
As a result of the U.S. Government's commitment to the
Ginnie Mae, these securities are virtually a risk-
free investment. This characteristic, together with
(4) This term is used by most references which means the
full guarantee from the U.S. Government
points will go to the mortgage servicer.
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its high liquidity and marketability in the secondary
market, makes GNMA the largest participant in the
pass-through market. By 1985, the total volume of the
GNMA's MBS outstanding had reached US$205 billion
which was more than half of the total MBS outstanding.
(5)
2) Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Pass-Through
Securities
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was
created in 1970 to facilitate Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLB) to participate in the secondary mortgage
market. Afterwards, FHLMC also included mortgage
bankers and commercial banks in its facilities.
Unlike GNMA, FHLMC is not a government corporation.
However, in view of its close relationship with FHL
Currently, FHLMC is the second largest player in the
pass-through market and there are three different
types of mortgage-backed securities issued by FHLMC at
present. These securities have different attributes
to cater for the diversified needs of investors. For
(5) Proliferation of Mortgage Securities, Mortgage
Banking, Sept, 1985, p.27
and its tax-exempt status, it may be considered as government-related or a
government-related or a guasi-government agency.
21
instance, the FHLMC Participation Certificates (PC)
have monthly payments of interest and principal while
the FHLMC Guaranteed Mortgage Certificates (GMC) have
semi-annual payments of interest but scheduled annual
repayments of principal. As there is no provision of
full faith and credit from the U.S. Government,
FHLMC itself guarantees the timely payment of interest
and no later than one year payment of principal.
However, these guarantees, though well qualified,
do not constitute any obligation on the U.S.
Government or FHLB. Apart from this, the
substantially lower outstanding volume makes FHLMC's
securities less marketable than those of GNMA. In
order to compensate for that, the FHLMC's certificates
usually have 20 basis points or more than the Ginnie
Mae.
3) Federal National Mortgage Association Pass-Through
Securities
After the split in 1968, the new Federal National
Mortgage Association has become a private corporation.
Although FNMA is still the largest debt holder of
residential mortgages, it is rather a newcomer in the
secondary mortgage market as it only started to issue
MBS in October 1981. The pass-through securities
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issued by FNMA are in many aspects similar to the
FHLMC Participation Certificates. Again there is no
U.S. Government obligation involved in the FNMA's MBS.
Therefore, FNMA guarantees the timely payment of
principal and interest whether collected or not.
4) Private Issue Mortgage-Backed Securities
Besides the above discussed mortgage pass-through
securities, there are private issues of mortgage-
backed instruments in the United States. Among the
many reasons for issuing MBS by private lending
institutions, the opportunities for them to enhance
liquidity and profitability are the main ones. At
present, there are both private issued mortgage-backed
bonds and mortgage pass-through certificates
outstanding in the United States.
a) Private Issue Mortgage-Backed Bonds
This is. a debt security with a fixed coupon rate and
a stated maturity. It is similar to. a corporate bond
but it is a step further by being secured by the
pledge of a pool of mortgage assets. However, the
purchasers of these securities do not have an
undivided claim on the pledged mortgage pool unless
the issuer defaults. The ownership of the mortgages
remains in the hand of the issuer. Apart from this,
mortgage-backed bonds give semi-annual interest and
23
return the face value of the bonds in lump sums at
maturity. Because of that, the investors do not have
any problem of cash flow uncertainty as the burden is
now transferred to the issuer.
b1 Private Issue Pass-Through Certificates
Like the mortgage pass-through securities discussed
previously, these private issue pass-through
certificates involve a pro rata ownership in the
mortgage pool. However, these securities do not have
any governmental support or guarantee from quasi-
government agencies. Therefore, the application of
mortgage insurance to cover a certain percentage of
the market value of the mortgage pool is necessary.
Apart from this major difference, the private issue
mortgage pass-through securities have terms compatible
with those issued by GNMA, FHLMC or FNMA.
24
3_4 RATING OF PRIVATE ISSUE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
In order to compete with the mortgage-backed securities
issued by GNMA, FHLMC or FNMA, the private issue MBS must
have some attributes to convince the investors that they
are of high quality and carry low risk of default.
Besides the application of substantial mortgage insurance
to the pool, the use of credit rating facilities is non-
substitutable. The rating agencies, like Standard Poor,
utilize various rating factors to establish ratings for
the mortgage-backed securities. In general, the factors
employed for this purpose are the main concerns of the
investors in buying MBS. As the two types of private
issues have fundamental differences in their structures,
the required rating factors and their relative importance
are also different. Exhibit 3.1 outlines the various
rating factors employed and their comparative
significance.
1)_ The nature and quality of The mortgage pool
In general, the FHA/VA insured mortgages, because of
government's backing, are of higher quality than
conventional mortgages, and single-family mortgages
are preferred because of the inherited commitment of
owners to their houses. Hence, FHA/VA insured single-
family mortgages are considered as the prime pool for
MBS.
25
From the Exhibit, it can be seen that the quality of
mortgages has a greater impact on the pass-through
securities. This is because whether an investor can
receive his pro rata share is directly related to the
default rate of the mortgages. On the other hand, the
backed bonds are general obligations of the issuer,
and the investors are less exposed to the default risk
of the mortgage loans.
2) The liquidity of the underlying mortgages
In the event of default, if the investors need to
liquidate and sell the pledged mortgages while they
cannot do so easily at prevailing marketing price,
then the potential losses will still be imposed on
them. Therefore, this factor is of paramount
importance to both pass-through securities and backed
bonds.
3) The interest rate protection and the maintenance
level of MBS
This factor is exclusively applicable to mortgage-
backed bonds because the interest and principal
payments of mortgages go to the issuer first. he
investors can only have their. principal back at
maturity. However, as the mortgage loans are
gradually repaid or if the interest rate rises, the
26
EXHIBIT 3.1
A COMPARISON OF THE RATING CRITERIA FOR MORTGAGE PASS-




1) The nature and quality
23of the mortgage pool
2) The liquidity of the
22underlying mortgages




4) The level and nature
3 1of insurance coverage
to the mortgage pool
5) The creditworthiness of
3 1the involved mortgage
insurance company
6) The creditworthiness of
2the issuer and/or servicer 3





Source: Recommendations of Standard's Poor for rating MBS
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market value of the mortgage pool will decline
accordingly while the value of outstanding securities
remains the same. In order to protect the interest of
the investors, the market value of the pool must be
much greater than the amount of securities issued, for
instance, overcollaterization at 175 percent.
Besides, a maintenance level must be stipulated.
This is to transfer additional eligible mortgages to
the pool whenever. this level is reached. As a result,
the overall market value of the pool will be at least
a specified percentage, for example 135 percent, of
the total debt outstanding.
4) The level and nature of insurance coverage to the
mortgage pool
This rating factor is mainly applied to the pass-
through securities because there is no government
back-up in case of delinquencies or foreclosures of
component mortgages in the pool. Also, the timely
payments of principal and interest do not constitute a
legal obligation of the issuer. Therefore, in order
to enhance the quality of MBS so issued, the issuer
will provide an equity feature or insurance coverage
to the mortgage pool. The amount of insurance will
depend on the size and quality of the mortgage pool,
and the desired rating of the MBS.
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5) The creditworthiness of the involved insurance company
Based on the above discussion, this is again a main
consideration for pass-through securities. In the
event of default, the insurance company will be
required to compensate the credit losses up to the
policy limit. If the insurance company is unable to
reimburse this amount or defaults, then the investors
will still be vulnerable to losses no matter how high
the initial insurance coverage may be. Hence, in
addition to the level of insurance, the rating agency
will be seriously concerned about the financial
strength of the involved insurance company in
assessing the MBS.
6) The creditworthiness of the issuer and/or servicer
The creditworthiness of the issuer and/or servicer is
relatively more important to the investors of
mortgage-backed bonds because the issuer has a general
obligation to them. The timely payment of interest to
the bond holders will be jeopardized if the issuer
defaults. Also, it is the sole responsibility of the
issuer to keep the stipulated maintenance level of the
mortgage pool. On the other hand, the capability of
the issuer or servicer will be important to both types
of MBS because the possibility of default in the.
underlying mortgage pool will somehow depend on its
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mortgage originating and servicing skills
7) The indenture terms
This is more important to mortgage-backed bonds
because the indenture terms will stipulate how far the
obligation of the issuer will go, for instance, the
frequency of revaluation of the mortgage pool and the
types of collateral used for substitution in keeping
the maintenance level. Concerning the pass-through
securities, most private issuers will try to set the
terms to resemble their government and quasi-
government counterparts so as to enhance their
competitiveness in the secondary market.
Although there is no credit rating agency in Hong Kong,
the factors discussed above will still provide the
fundamental framework for investors when they consider
buying locally issued MBS, provided that they really
exist.
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3.5 EVALUATION OF MBS AND THEIR HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE
As a consequence of the rapid growth of MBS in the 1970s,
besides having credit ratings for them, there was a
performance index introduced by Salomon Brothers Inc. for
March 1979. This index gives investors a reference in
comparing the performance of MBS against other fixed
income instruments like corporate bonds.
In Exhibit 3.2, Salomon Brothers compared the return of
its MBS with that of its High-Grade Corporate Bond over a
period of 9.5 years from 197 to June 1981. Based on the
established MBS Index, the historical evidence indicated
that the mortgage index outperformed the HG Corporate Bond
Index by a total return of 15 percent.
EXHIBIT 3.2 A COMPARISON OF RETURNS OF THE SB H-G CORPORATE
BONDS AND SB MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH SECURITIES
SB H-G SB Mortgage Advantage
Corporate Pass-Through of Mortgage
Bond Index Index Index
-1.13%1972 7.26% 6.13`











31.17%Entire period 46.17% 15.O%
All returns result from compounding monthly returns
nonannualized
Source: Adapted from The Historical Performance of
Mortgage Securities 1972-81 by Salomon Brothers Inc.
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When similar comparisons were made with other fixed income
investments, the evidence again supported that MBS had
better performance. To explain this historical trend, the
probable reasons are the shorter average maturity of the
mortgages (statistically 12 years) during a period of
an upward trend in interest rates and the relatively
higher yield of mortgages.
Although the MBS has been demonstrating better performance
than other fixed income securities, one important aspect
that MBS lacks is the certainty on yield to maturity. In
general, investors would like to know the yield to
maturity of their instruments so that they can evaluate
their desired investment portfolio. However, the
prepayment factor inherited in MBS makes the calculation
of its yield to maturity impossible. Investors can only
rely on historical data to estimate the yield
statistically. The problems of irregular cash flow and
reinvestment uncertainty most often come at the wrong
time. Mortgagors tend to repay or refinance their
mortgages when interest rates are falling while on the
other side the investors want to lock in their yield of
their MBS. Alternatively, when the interest rate goes up,
investors would be eager to have at least part of their
MBS redeemed so that they can re-invest the money at a
higher yield. However, there tends to be less prepayment
and refinancing of mortgages under this scenario.
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In light of the above conceptual problems, there have been
many modifications of the securities in the market. One
of these is the GNMA's stripped pass-through securities
which were designed to enable investors to hedge the
interest and prepayment problems. The concept involves
the separation of the certificates into the principal part
(P.O.) and the interest part (1.0.). Investors can either
buy P.O. or 1.0. or any combination of them according to
their risk preference. This kind of MBS is .now being
offered in Hong Kong, the details of which will be
discussed in Chapter Five.
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Today, the U.S. secondary mortgage market has developed
into a mature market. Besides its liquidity, depth and
breadth, the market also grows in its sophistication and
more innovations are expected in the future. Looking at
the reasons for its success, there are basically three
crucial factors:
1) There is a real need for a more efficient and
effective channel to direct funds for mortgage lending
in the United States. Besides, most traditional
mortgage lenders are eager to have more fundings as
well as higher liquidity for their mortgage portfolio.
Therefore, they acted as pioneers in developing the
secondary mortgage market.
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2) The U.S. Government has been playing a crucial role in
this market with its heavy commitment to both mortgage
loans and mortgage-backed securities. Besides, the
participation of the government-related agencies like
FHLMC and FNMA further enhance the breadth and
liquidity of the secondary mortgage market. Without
their involvement, there is some doubt as to whether
the prosperity of the market could have occurred today
3) There were major innovations of mortgage debt
instruments which are feasible in the United States.
In fact, the mechanism of pass-through is not as
simple as it appears. It involves many legal
considerations, one of which is the assignment right
of mortgages. Such an assignment right may involve a
lot of legal complications in other countries. In the
United States, the mortgage bankers who originate
loans for sale to other investors have already taken
this issue into consideration. Therefore, they will
include an estoppel certificate in the mortgage loan
file in order to facilitate the assignment of the
mortgage.
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Looking back to the situation in Hong Kong and taxing the
above discussion into consideration, we come up with two
basic questions: (1) Whether the above factors exist in
Hong Kong and, (2) Whether they are also the right kind of
ingredients for the development of an active secondary
mortgage market in Hong Kong or whatever there exist other
catalysts. In fact, the environment in Hong Kong is quite




THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET IN HONG KONG
In this chapter, the residential mortgage market in Hong
Kong will be discussed in detail. The Chapter will begin
with a survey of the Hong Kong residential mortgage market
by considering some key. characteristics of home mortgage
loans in Hong Kong and their correlation with the
residential property market. Following this will be a
discussion of the profiles of local mortgage lenders and
borrowers. Finally a general outlook and the future
trends of the Hong Kong mortgage market will be
hiahliahted.
4.1 HONG KONG RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET SURVEY
Since the post signing of the Sino-British agreement in
1984, the confidence in the future of Hong Kong was, to a
large extent, restored. This, together with the
prevailing low mortgage rates in the past two years
(Exhibit 4.1), has triggered another boom in the
residential property market. As can be seen from Exhibit
4.2, the residential market has witnessed record levels of
take-up and there is a clear upward trend in the number of
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sale and purchase agreements since 1983. The compounded
annual growth rate of this number amounts to 21% in the
period of 1983 to 1987. Looking at the reasons for such a
growth, besides the impact of low interest rates and
lenient mortgage policies, good economic performance and
rising household income levels are two other major
attributes. In order to have a more comprehensive and
quantitative measure of these effects, the Affordability
Quotient developed by Jones Lang Wooton may be utilized
for this purpose. (1) In general, the lower the Quotient
the more affordable is the residential property. As shown
in Exhibit 4.3, the Quotient started to fall from 1981 and
reached a low level that is compatible with that in the
mid 1970s. In other words, the economic conditions in
these years favor home ownership which in turn triggers
the spectacular growth of the residential property market.
Coming back to the home mortgage market, there is again an
upward trend of mortgages made, both in number and value,
during the period from 1983 to 1987. As reflected in
Exhibit 4.4, the level of mortgages made *in that period
moves closely with that of the level of sale and purchase
(1) The Affordability Quotient was developed by Jones
Lang Wooton. This is based on the purchase of a
typical small flat of around 500 sq.ft. and takes
account of 1) price of property 2) weighed average
of mortgage rate each year 3) changes in income as
reflected in the wage index 4) a 90% mortgage over
20 years.
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agreements. This may be an indication that there is a
positive correlation between the two. Therefore, it is
reasonable to believe that those factors that affect the
residential property market will also have a similar
impact on the home mortgage business in Hong Kong.
Basically, the Hong Kong residential mortgage market is
the interaction of the supply and demand for mortgage
loans. In order to have a comprehensive description of
the market, the desired approach is to consider the
mortgagees who supply mortgage loans and the mortgagors
who required mortgage credits and their relationships as
well.
4.2 MORTGAGEES- SUPPLY OF MORTGAGE LOANS
4.2.1 General Characteristics
Unlike the housing mortgage market in the United States
where there is a whole spectrum of financial institutions
and government or government-related corporations. engaging
in mortgage lending, there are mainly two types of
financial institutions, namely the banks and the deposit
taking companies (DTCs), responsible for the mortgage
business in Hong Kong. From Exhibit 4.5, it can be seen
that the percentage of mortgage loans outstanding in the
bank sector represents more than one half with a clear
upward trend relative to that of the DTC sector. Besides,
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the growth of the mortgage business as reflected from the
bar chart is tremendous. During the period 1983
(December) to 1987 (September), the compounded annual
percentage increase reached a record level of around 35%.
In Hong Kong, the funding for mortgage lending is more
straightforward than in the United States because there
are mostly primary activities in the business. Most of
the financial institutions obtain their funding for
mortgages through either saving deposits or interbank
lending and they usually hold their loan portfolio till
maturity after origination.
4.2.2 Profitability and competition
As it will be explained in more detail in Chapter Six, the
profitability of the mortgage business in Hong Kong is
really attractive. Assuming the mortgage rate is 1.5%
above prime rate while prime rate to 3-month HIBOR
differential on average is 1.2%, the more than two percent
interest spread of mortgage lending is substantial. (2)
Furthermore, since home mortgage lending in Hong Kong is
one of the perceived low default risk businesses, (3) and
the banks will undoubtly benefit from large market shares
(2) Referenced from Summary Information on the Hong Kong
Housing Mortgage Market, Merrill Lynch Capital
Markets.
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as they can enjoy economy of scale in administrating costs
and fixed overheads, most banks and DTCs in Hong Kong are
eager to increase their own market share. As a result,
there is severe interbank competition for the home
mortgage business. Apart from this interbank competition,
there are external pressures exerted by other interested
institutional investors who want to take a slice of
this lucrative business. Nevertheless, owing to some
regulatory constraints like banking licenses and their
lack of origination skills and market networks, it may be
better for them to engage in the secondary mortgage
business instead of participating in the already
competitive Drimarv residential mortgage market.
4.2.3 Market Analysis of the home mortgage business
Looking at the present situation, the various important
ingredients of a market leader in taking mortgage business
are origination skills, availability of a low-cost deposit
base, level of economy of scale in administrating and
servicing mortgage loans, and marketing networks. As the
Hong Kong Bank Group has nearly all of these attributes,
it is not unreasonable that it, together with Citibank,
(3) Referenced from Summary Information on the Hong Kong
Housing Mortgage Market, Merrill Lynch Capital
Markets. The credit write offs for owner occupiers
is only 5-15 basis points (BP).
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have already grasped a 57 percent market share. (4)
Although there are no exact figures available, it is
agreed that the remaining business is scattered among the
rest of the players in the market with most of them having
less than a five percent market share.
Among the various categories of banks mentioned in the
research methodology, the Bank of China (BOC) Group is the
most aggressive one. The mortgage rates they charge are
usually the lowest in the market while their agreed loan
to value ratio is remarkably high with long repayment
periods. As indicated in Exhibit 4.6, the Kwang Tung
Provincial Bank and the Bank of China are the two most
aggressive banks. The mortgage rate they charge was, most
of the time, 0.25% lower than that of other major market
participants like Hang Seng Bank. Besides, the loan to
value ratio reached 90% while the repayment period can be
as long as 25 years. The combined effect of these
favorable terms is the comparatively smaller amount of
monthly payment which is also one of the most important
mortgage choosing criteria of the end-users. However,
with reference to the same Exhibit, the monthly payment
can only be reduced by several hundred dollars in this
scenario.
(4) Referenced from Summary Information on the Hong Kong
Housing Mortgage Market, Merill Lynch Capital
Markets.
41
Such a small amount as compared to the whole monthly
payment of approximately six thousand dollars may be
immaterial from the mortgagors' point of view. In order to
make this reduction in monthly repayment significant and
visible to the mortgagors, the banks can either further
reduce the mortgage rate or increase the loan period.
However, these actions will inevitably reduce the
profitability while increasing the risk exposure of the
banks. Therefore most of the banks adopt other strategies
in attracting their customers. The basic idea of these
strategies is to offer a comprehensive package of a
mortgage loan which includes other product features in
addition to the actual financing. The product features
commonly used by the banks are as follows:
1) Quick and competitive mortgages with all procedures
and formalities simplified for the sake of convenience
of the'mortgagors.
2) Professional financial consultancy about the property
market, the flat, the financing and legal matters.
3) Small or even no commission fee for the mortgages and
no penalty for early redemption if the loan has
already been outstanding for a*stipulated period.
4) A range of comprehensive insurance plans at
competitive premium rates in the mortgage package.
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5) Various repayment options to suit the needs and
preferences of the mortgagors like the straight-line
method, multi-tier method or reducing balance method.
6) An equity line of credit to the mortgagors in addition
to the mortgage. This is to translate the part of
repaid principal into a standby overdraft with ready
cash in case of need.
7) Financing of other expenditures like renovation cost
and lawyer's fees in the mortgage package.
In the future, more and more innovative mortgage packages
will be expected since this has already become one of the
most important competitive edges of the financial
institutions. Besides the significance of product
innovation in mortgage lending, connections with
developers, lawyers and brokers are very crucial to the
banks if they want to get a higher market share. In
general, there is no compulsory assignment of mortgagees
to the home purchasers when they buy their flats.
However, if the purchasers do not have any close
relationship with a particular bank, they will rely
heavily on the advice and recommendation of developers,
lawyers or brokers. Therefore, most of the banks in Hong
Kong are eager to establish good relationship with these
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market participants. In fact, some banks even have
business agreements with developers and they offer special
discounts to the customers of these developers. On the
other hand, the developers may give discounts on the
property prices to the potential buyers if they choose the
recommended banks for financing.
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4.3 MORTGAGORS- DEMAND FOR MORTGAGE CREDIT
As a result of the economic recovery in the past few
years, the general rise in income level of most people has
triggered their great desire to have their own house. In
order to have a thorough understanding of mortgage demand
and its potential, the characteristics of the residential
end-users and any associated trend will be discussed
below.
4.3.1 Attributes of residential end-users
1. Income level and Living standard
As it can be seen from Exhibit 4.7, there was a steady
increase in Per capita G.D.P. at constant (1980) market
price for the period 1976 to 1986. Also, there was a
corresponding increase in Per capita private consumption
expenditure. Such a real growth in income level and rise
in living standard provided the fundamental incentive for
people to buy their own house.
2. Traditional value of the importance of accommodation
One of the catalysts in triggering the desire for home
ownership is the Chinese traditional value of the
importance of accommodation. Even nowadays, most Chinese
believe that having at least a satisfactory accommodation
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is of first and foremost importance. Therefore, they are
willing to sacrifice other expenditures in order to
concentrate their wealth in purchasing their own home.
Furthermore, even in case of financial difficulty, most
end-users will still try hard to maintain their mortgage
repayments. In fact, this is one of the prime reasons why
the Hong Kong residential mortgage business has a record
of very low default rates. (5)
3. Trend of age group distribution
With reference to Exhibit 4.8 which show a breakdown of
population into age bands, the population of marriageable
age continues to be the most numerous category in 1986.
Also, there is a substantial increase in the number of
economically active people in the 25-30 age band, which is
a common marriage age. Hence, this is one of the reasons
for the strong demand for residential units since 1983.
(5) According to information from the Standard Chartered
Bank, the residential mortgage default rate for
record of one 'to two months delinquency is less than
half of one-percent.
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4. Trend of average family size per household
The Chinese tradition of living together in a big family
has already been substituted by an opposite trend of
separate households after marriage. As a result, there is
a decrease in the number of people per household as shown
in Exhibit 4.9. This downward trend is especially obvious
in the private sectors which implies that there will be a
promising demand for residential units.
4.3.2 Criteria for choosing mortaaae loans
1. Relationship with bankers
The end-users will in general go to their bankers for
financial services and consultancy when they want to buy
their own house. However, if they do not have any
relationship with a particular banker, they will follow
the recommendation of the developer or choose the bank
with most favorable terms.
2. Importance of a small down payment
There is an increasing number of middle range steady
income people in Hong Kong. One of their common practices
is that they like to purchase their own home when they are
young or even before they marry. Because of their stable
income stream, they are less price conscious in buying a
flat. Instead, they are much more concerned with the
actual amount of the down payment with related fees and
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the monthly payments that follow. Therefore, whether they
can afford to buy a flat will be critically determined by
the amount of the down payment.
As keen competition has already driven most banks to offer
a loan to value ratio of 90 percent for newly-built houses
with a loan period of about 20 years, more and more
marginal end-users are now able to afford the down payment
as well as the monthly payments under the prevailing low
interest rate scenario. Their inclusion in the mortgage
market will surely enhance the overall demand for
residential mortgages.
3. Early redemption of mortgage loans
Although many mortgage loans stipulate a repayment period
of 15 to 20 years, their average maturity is much shorter,
especially when the prevailing interest rate is low. (6)
Usually, people like to increase their monthly payments it
order to pay off their mortgages when they move up the
hierarchy of society. Also, people are eager to MOVE
and sell their homes and to have better accommodations if
their income allows them to do so. Therefore, the option
of early redemption with only a small or no penalty
becomes a necessary term in the mortgage contract.
(6) According to information from the Standard Chartered
Bank, the average life-span of a home mortgage in Hong
Kong is only seven to eight years.
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4.4 GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY MARKET
The Hong Kong Government has been playing an important
role in housing. At the end of 1985/86, the Housing
Authority owned and managed 118 rental public housing
estates containing 542,000 flats and managed 33 Home
Ownership Courts. At present, the Government housing
programmes provide approximately 30,000 public rental
flats and 10,000 HOS and PSPS flats a year. This
represents more than one half of the total 85,048 units
provided by the private and public sectors in the year
1985/86. However, it is obvious that the Hong Kong
Government's role is basically confined to the provision
of public housing estates and HOS and PSPS flats. Unlike
the U.S. Government which provides insurance backing to
home mortgages through the FHA or the VA and actively
participates in the secondary mortgage market through its
full faith and credit in the GNMA's MBS, there is no
explicit financial support of home purchasing by the Hong
Kong Government other than the comparatively lower prices
and interest rates of the HOS and PSPS flats. Hence, it
can be said that both the U.S. Government and the Hong
Kong Government are helping their own people acquire
accommodations, but there are fundamental differences in
the positioning of their roles with respect to the whole
spectrum of residential property market activities.
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4.5 OUPTOCK FOR THE HONG KONG MORTGAGE BUSINESS
In postulating potential trends and growth of the
residential mortgage business, the implications of the
global stock markets crash in October, 1987 should not be
overlooked. However, it is believed that the crisis will
have a larger impact on the commercial and industrial
sector and a lesser effect on the residential market.
Also, as it is the property investment activities that are
affected more instead of the genuine end-user market, the
prices of residential properties will be less volatile and
are expected to undergo consolidation. This may in turn
act as a driving force for the mortgage business because
more end-users are now able to afford buying their own
houses.
Apart from the stock market crash impact, there are other
factors that will affect the residential mortgage business
in Hong Kong, and they are:
1) Population growth and household formation rates.
2) Economic growth and employment
3) Personal and household income
4) New housing supply and property prices
5) Interest rates and mortgage policies
6) Government policies
71 Living style trends
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As these factors have been described previously and most
of them have already shown encouraging trends, the
mortgage business is expected to sustain its growth with
good profit margins in the foreseeable future. In Chapter
Six, there will be more detailed figures and a description
of the projected growth in the mortgage business by 2001
and particularly an analysis of its impacts on banks.
Although there is an optimistic outlook for the
residential mortgage business, there is historical
evidence showing that the property market in Hong Kong is
a rather cyclic business and that volatility is the name
of the game. In general, the prosperity of the
residential property market depends on many factors, for
instance, economic performance, political stability and
confidence, as well as other external stimulants. Looking
back to Exhibit 4.2, it can be seen that there were
already two cycles within the last ten years. The recent
downturn in 1981 to 1983 was mainly due to the global
economic recession and the political uncertainty crisis
in Hong Kong about 1997 at that time.
In view of this lucrative yet volatile home mortgage
business, what should the financial institutions with
heavy commitments in this sector do? This question will
inevitably become their major consideration, and it will
be discussed in Chapter Six.
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Exhibit 4.1
A Graph of Mortgage rate charged by the principal banks



























A Graph of Number of Agreements for Sale and Purchase for the
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A Graph of Number of Mortgages other than Building Mortgages
























A Graph of Residential Mortgage Loans Outstanding in Hong Kong



















A Graph of Percentgae Composition of Mortgage Loans Outstanding


















(Adepted from 'Surmary Information on the Hong Kong Housing Market',Merrill Lynch Capital Markets)
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A Graph of Per Capita G.D.P. and Per Capita Private Consumption
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DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS
IN HONG KONG
Debt securitization is a hot topic among the bankers
today. This can be a means of raising funds without
incurring the costs of additional equity capital. In the
search for suitable financial assets for sales, mortgage
debt seems a very attractive candidate. This is fairly
understandable since mortgage debt is apparently a very
healthy asset that has a ready market. Besides, the best
quality debt asset could also be yielding the lowest
return per capital tie-down. Selling some of these assets
and re-investing in other higher yield assets could
therefore help to boost the overall return on the bank's
equity.
Although full scale mortgage securitization still has not
taken place in Hong Kong, there are some trends in the
market that worth mentioning. There are four different
developments of secondary mortgage transactions observable
in the market; namely,
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i) selling a portion of mortgage loans off the balance
sheet in a deal-by-deal basis,
ii) arranging a large mortgage syndication with a
tradeable feature.
iii) trading of US mortgage-backed instruments (US-dollar
denomination) in Hong Kong,
iv) setting up a special vehicle for the purpose of
holding and administering mortgages and mortgage-
backed instruments.
5.1 Selling of mortgage portfolios in Hong Kong
There are a few cases of selling portions of mortgage
loans off the balance sheets of some small local Chinese
banks (The names of the banks will not be mentioned.) The
major reasons of such sell-offs are realignment of asset
categories and liquidating portions of the portfolios.
Incidentally, these few cases occurred around 1984-85 when
there was a major banking crisis in Hong Kong. Although it
is unjustified to say that those banks who 'sold-off' part
of their assets during this period were faced with
internal problems, nevertheless, during this turbulent
time, it was wise to strengthen the balance sheet position
so as to survive the crisis.
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The partial sell-off has been conducted on a deal-by-deal
basis. The asset-originator generally remains the
administrator of the mortgage, but almost all the benefits
of the assets have been sold off. This is inevitably the
case when a well-structured secondary market is totally
absent and the weak players in the market have little or
no bargaining power.
Despite the bad connotation of the past sell-offs in the
market, many of the local bankers still believe that such
practice can actually be used to gear up the profits of
mortgage banks. This is particularly feasible when there
are some cash-rich Japanese bankers 'fishing' around it
Honq Konq.
Most of the Japanese bankers in Hong Kong are engaged
primarily in syndicated loans, project financings, etc.
These kinds of business, because of the large sizes of the
deals, cannot provide a continuing flow of business
volume. The .proceeds generated by their main lines of
business therefore require a good place to invest in; and
mortgage business can be one of their targets.
However, most Japanese banks do not have the local
connections, nor the infra-structure for the actual point-
of-sales. Thus, it becomes exceedingly difficult for them
to compete effectively in the primary mortgage market.
Instead, the Japanese banks can earn a share of the
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profits through secondary participation in the market.
They can and do actually buy up others' mortgage
portfolios. Of course, they earn less interest points
because of the discounting nature of the transactions;
however, there is a corresponding saving in the
administration costs and maintenance costs of a scattered
infra-structure.
5.2 Mortaaae syndication with a tradeable feature
The values of many commercial complexes in Hong Kong are
ever-escalating; there is a constant shortage of Prime
Grade A office space to buy or lease in prime areas. This
explains why many of the properties companies would like
to develop and hold their core commercial complexes
themselves. Generally, these properties companies can
finance their development projects through issuing stock
or project financing. The shortcomings of these methods
are that they result either in dilution of ownership or in
heavy interest payments.
As a company grows larger in size and become more
professionally managed, they learn how to access the
capital market. Some are strong enough to issue unsecured
commercial papers, while some would like to issue loan
certificates that are backed up by their core properties.
The backed up loan certificates are in effect a large
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syndicated mortgage. A reported case of this type in 1987
was the Shui On Centre deal.
The Shui On deal takes the form of transfer-loan
certificates with the tradeable feature among the banks.
The participating banks can adjust their exposure simply
by discounting some of their portfolio to other banks.
This trading therefore constitutes secondary transactions
of the original mortgage loan.
Since now the loan certificate has an improved liquid
feature and a good backed-up prime properties, the
borrowing costs of the properties company would therefore
reasonably be much lowered. Nevertheless, the
underdevelopment of the Hong Kong capital market can be a
major impediment to the widespread use of such low-cost
financing.
5.3 Ginnie Mae's debut in Hong Kong
In October, 1987, a market survey was done by W.S.
Mooney's Securities to test the marketability of the US-
denomination mortgage-backed securities in Hong Kong. The
result was very encouraging and that prompted Mooney's
first move into the Hong Kong capital market. The Company
established an office here in early 1988 and has started
to market the US Ginnie Mae papers for local investors
here
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The Ginnie Mae papers look particularly attractive to
conservative local investors. Currently, the targets are
the local institutional funds. The papers can offer the
highest degree of safety, higher yields, good
marketability and therefore liquidity.
Like all asset-backed securities, the GM papers are backed
up by the payments generated by a pool of guaranteed
mortgages. The promptness of the payments of principal and
interest are guaranteed by the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA). The guarantee is further
backed by the full faith and credit of the US Government,
and therefore, provides the extra safety.
The GM papers also have a stripped feature that segregates
the cash flow into principal-only (PO) and interest-only
(10) portions. The coupon rate (which was 11% in late
1987) can then be the lowest guaranteed return on the
papers. The PO portion can actually yield a much higher
return because of the early repayment feature of almost
all mortgages. The mortgage life in the US runs as high as
30 years, but statistically, it is prepaid in 12 years.
Therefore, the actual yield of the papers is dependent on
the amount of these early prepayments.
Usually, PO paper is purchased at a discount of the
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remaining principal balance so as to generate the
competitive market yield. Therefore, the earlier the
prepayment, the shorter will be the holding period to
total collection, and that means a much greater yield for
the papers. According to the record of Mooney, the average
yield of these papers in 1987 was 17%, while in 1986 it
was 15%.
Good marketability and liquidity is another added
advantage of the GM papers. This feature provides the
vital facility for investors' cash management to meet any
current need or to build a cash surplus portfolio. Active
secondary market activities are maintained by a group of
Ginnie Mae dealers, government securities traders, etc.,
while the broad range of investing groups like saving and
loan associations, credit unions and retirement/pension
funds serve as the ultimate holders of the papers.
Excellent liquidity is then maintained on a 24-hour basis,
and therefore, provides an extra advantage of the papers
over the local instruments.
5.4 Local mortgage-backed instruments advocated by
Merrill Lynch
In early 1987, Merrill Lynch undertook a thorough study of
localizing the mortgage-backed idea here in Hong Kong. The
findings were very encouraging, and it was stated that the
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securitization techniques as practiced in the United
Kingdom are very much applicable to the Hong Kong
environment. The principal reasons are the similarities in
the governmental influences over the housing market, legal
and taxation issues.
The principal means of securitization in the UK has been
the use of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV). The major
advantages of SPV are follows:-
i) facilitate balance sheet management since the
mortgage assets are sold to the SPV off the balance
sheet, therefore, avoiding the consolidation in the
accounts of the mortgage banks,
ii) risk sharing with the ultimate investors and
therefore can gear up the total mortgage business
within the risk control ceilings,
iii) retention of control of the mortgage business since
the banks control the SPV wholly.
iv) maintain market stability with the existing mortgage
customers since the banks still manage the mortgage
repayments under an administration agreement with the
SPV therefore, customers do not get involved with
the secondary transactions,
v) increase the liquidity of the mortgage-backed
instruments by acting as a market maker.
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The normal profits of booking mortgage loans can proauce
the surplus cash flow to the SPV which become the excess
for the originating banks. Therefore, profits are not lost
through the selling of mortgage assets off the balance
sheet. The result is simply that banks have removed part
of their loans from the books and then used the proceeds
to make further business.
Merrill Lynch has actually completed its study on
localizing the product idea. Marketing activities started
in late 1987 and the result is certainly dependent on the
interests and internal pressures of local mortgage
bankers. They will accept the product idea only when those
advantages mentioned above are of genuine concern to them.
In the following chapter, discussion will be focused on
the internal pressures of local bankers.
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CHAPTER 6
MORTGAGE LENDING PRESSURES ON BANKS IN HONG KONG
In the following discussion, a forecast of the growth of
the primary mortgage market in Hong Kong will be made. The
generally high growth phase in the forthcoming years
certainly poses a great pressure on the debt exposure in
this particular properties related sector. The nature of a
bank's constraints and options to cater for such market
conditions will be the main theme of this chapter.
Hopefully, the bank can find the right balance of control
and yet still capture the opportunity ahead.
6.1 General trends in the mortgage market of Hong Kong
Referring to Exhibit 6.1, the mortgages outstanding in
HK$, one can easily see that the mortgage market is
growing handsomely at over 20% p.a. during the period of
1983-1987. This is due in part to the persistent inflation
and in part to the cyclical upswing of the properties
market. Historical evidence indicates that the next swing
of the properties market almost always surpasses the
previous swing, and therefore, so will be the size of the
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mortgage market.
Besides the observable market performance, it is worthy to
note the housing policy of the government. The current
policies encourage the 'buyers' market rather than the
'renters' market, and therefore support the primary
mortgage market.
According to the 85/86 Housing Authority Annual Report,
there are still about 380,000 family units not adequately
housed.. Over the period to 2001, about another 550,000 new
family units will be added, while at the same time,
another 155,000 family units will be displaced by the
urban redevelopment program. In other words, there will be
over a million households demanding housing units over the
period to 2001.
The Report states clearly that the above estimate has not
allowed for the upward mobility of the family units that
will seek improved living conditions. The upward mobility
also contributes in dollar term to the overall size of the
mortgage market. Another contributing trend is that there
is a growing number of people who wish to buy their own
housing units rather than rent them. As quoted in the
Report, more than 40,000 people applied for the 7,000 Home
Ownership Scheme flats under the Phase 8A sales exercise
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at the end of 1985. The oversubscription rate is almost
six-fold.
The Report states that demand continues to exceed supply.
The Authority has planned to produce a further 48,000
flats for sale over the period 1986-1990, which is more
than 12% of the total supply of the public and private
production of housing units in Hong Kong. With this Home
Ownership Scheme, the government's housing policy has
actually provided a boost for the 'buyers' market and
hence the mortgage market.
Favorable mortgage facilities for purchasers are provided
by participating banks and DTCs. The loans are generally
up to 95% of the flat price, and that is an additional
push on the size of the mortgage volume. Moreover, the
repayment period is 15 to 20 years, a rather lengthy
period running beyond 1997.
More importantly, the maximum chargeable rate agreement
reached between the government and the participating
financial institutions has allowed the expansion of the
mortgage customer base without assuming unnecessary risk.
The government regulated rate certainly benefits the lower
income group and therefore enhances their participation in
the mortgage market.
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A_2 Estimated mortaaae size at 2001
Reference to Exhibit 6.2 the Housing Development in Hong
Kong, the top line is based on the government forecast of
the total housing stock. By subtracting the stock for
public housing, the middle line for private ownership
stock is derived. On the bottom runs the forecast line on
the estimated size of the mortgage market.
The upper branch running parallel to the growth of housing
stock results in an estimated market size of HK$ 200
billion. This represents a consistent growth rate of 10.3%
annually. The lower branch, reflecting a much lower growth
rate of 6.2% annually, shows an estimated market size of
HK$ 120 billion.
Compared with even the lower estimate of the forecast, the
mortgage market will grow from a size of.HK$ 53 billion in
1987 to a size of HK$ 120 billion in 2001. This results in
two immediate problems for all banks in Hong Kong, namely:
i) how to obtain the additional HK$ 67 Billion?
ii) how to control the risk exposure concentrated in this
particular sector?
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6.3 Banks' internal and external constraints
From the above discussion, it is generally clear that the
mortgage market is in a high growth phase. The profit is
still attractive and banks may well continue expanding
their mortgage business despite the keen competition.
However, problems may arise and 'good' going business may
over-stretch the commitment of banks in this properties
related sector. To achieve the required degree of control
and flexibility, the banks certainly need some new
financial instruments that can provide the necessary
solutions.
However, there are some conflicting constraints that the
banks need to address before considering any viable
solution. These constraints will be discussed in this
section. A feasibility study of the possible solutions
will be given in later chapters.
First of all, banks have their own internal credit limits
that safe guard against the exposure of debt assets in one
particular industry. These internal limits will help to
avoid over-concentration of risk that could reasonably be
diversified. The risk characteristic of the bank as a
whole should be monitored through such an internal control
mechanism.
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On the other hand, the banks have well estabiisnea sKllls
and resources, such as the financial staff, legal experts,
retail outlets, etc., that have been heavily oriented or
even committed to the mortgage business. The strengths and
expertise that have been accumulated through the years of
operation should not be allowed to deteriorate. This is
particularly the case when the banks have a comparative
advantage in booking mortgage-type loans and possibly
have achieved economies of scale.
As a result, this leads to a certain minimum production
level that helps to maintain the advantages thus far
achieved. In other words, the mortgage business keeps
coming in and overloads the balance sheet with heavy
mortgage exposure. This will soon ring the alarm of an
internal credit limit unless there is an effective way to
off-load the pressure. The banks should find an effective
mechanism to. regulate the steady inflow of business volume
against the associated risk of over-concentration.
In addition to internal limitations, there are some
external pressures that complicate the issue. It is not a
simple problem of off-loading the business by selling part
of the portfolio or by tapping down the overall.
commitment. Some of these considerations are of strategic
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nature or liquidity nature.
As outlined in chapter 4, competition ana marxez
characteristics dictate that larger rewards of the
business would be gained by acquiring a larger proportion
of the market share. The strategic focus should be placed
on skillful loan origination rather than a deliberate slow
down to limit the business commitment. Profits are earned
through a healthy business building process that captures
reasonably any market opportunity. Profits are not earned
by shying away' and refusing to manage risk of any
reasonable degree. More importantly, an active building
process has additional advantages over a passive strategy.
Active participation in the market helps to build up the
reputation and the customer relationships that no passive
approach could bring. In short, business activities in the
primary mortgage market should be encouraged.
Regarding the liquidity concerns of banks, there are
mainly two major threats. The first one is the growing
trend of investment fund unit trusts. These will undermine
directly the traditional cheap sources of funds for the
mortgage business. This is particularly critical when
there is a growing demand for mortgage business as
outlined above, while at the same time, there is a
shrinking supply of funds for the business.
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It may be feasible that banks could introduce some
financial instruments which would encourage investors in
unit trusts to return to the banks as providers of funds
for supporting the primary mortgage business. Mortgage-
backed securities can be one of the alternatives in which
previous depositors now buying investment unit trusts that
in turn invest in the mortgage-backed securities, and thus
in effect supply the funds necessary for the-primary
mortgage business. The banks have actually tapped their
internal resources for funding purposes through the use of
capital market instruments instead of the traditional way
of deposit taking.
The second threat comes directly from the mis-match
between the average life of mortgage loans and the
commitment of the deposit base. Generally, the deposit
base of banks is deemed to be short in comparison with the
seven year average mortgage life. There is always a
liquidity risk when the long-term loan assets of banks are
supported mainly by short-term deposit liabilities. The
banks have no way to ascertain the movements of deposits
while at the same time have to make fixed commitments on a
long-term basis. The situation can be hazardous when the
political threat of uncertainty of 1997 is drawing near
and people start diverting their funds elsewhere. It may
be speculative, but the threat is genuine. The idea of
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mortgage-backed securities may provide a means to tie
11
down the commitment of some of the local funds.
H_4 Traditional control mechanism on mortgage business
Most of the banks here use pricing as a means to regulate
the desired level of production of their mortgage
business. This may have operated satisfactorily so far.
However, the use of 'margin-above-prime' as the only way
to regulate the inflow of business is somewhat inadequate
to cater for the high growth phase mentioned above.
The adjustment is generally around 0.25%, a fairly small
amount. Because of the quasi-cartel arrangement among the
banks not to use pricing as a competition tool, this small
adjustment is all they can do. Any substantial divergence
from this reference level may be easily mistaken as an
unfriendly price war. Nobody is going to risk that when
they are earning their fair share of the market.
However, the effect of this adjustment on a loan of 15-20
year does not appeal to the mortgage customer. The general
customer is not sophisticated enough to comprehend the
difference of a quarter point. They simply look at the
monthly repayment schedule and compare that with their
financial capability. Their take-home pay is on a monthly
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basis and their decision-making frame will be likewise.
The difference of a quarter point on a mortgage of 15-20
year results merely in a difference of a few hundreds of
dollars. This becomes somewhat negligible when there are
other important concerns such as faster approval services,
higher percentage of financing and better terms on re-sale
before completing payment. Therefore, the adjustment as a
tapping device is totally inadequate. One of the primary
purposes of this paper is to further investigate the
possibility of having a secondary mortgage instrument to
solve the control problem over the forthcoming high growth
phase of the primary mortgage business.
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MORTGAGE LENDING MAKES MONEY IN HONG KONG
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WHO ARE THE PROSPECTIVE ISSUERS?
In order to identify the prospective issuers of mortgage-
backed securities, those institutions holding, mortgages
are first determined. Basically, banks and deposit-taking
companies are the major mortgage loan originators in Hong
Kong. Unlike the market structure in the United States, a
Government agency solely involved in the mortgage business
such as GNMA is absent in Hong Kong. There is only one
listed company, the Hong Kong Building Loan Agency
Limited that can be classified as a mortgage-lending
company. The Hong Kong Government has some stake in it but
the major shareholders are the Hongkong Bank, Standard
Chartered Bank, Far East Bank and Hang Seng Bank.
Therefore,, it is operated as a finance company and equity
and long-term debts are its. main sources of funds. The
Hong Kong Government has little influence on its
operations. Moreover, it plays a passive role in the
market. This company targets only on small to medium sized
mortgages.
Besides, the Hong Kong Housing Society also held a
negligible amount of mortgage loans which were originated
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in 1977 and the Society has already ceased to offer any
mortgage loans.(1)
7.1 BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
As discussed in the previous chapters, the two main
reasons for a bank or a deposit-taking company to
securitize its mortgage loans are maintaining a good
balance of assets and coping with the growing mortgage
demand. Except for the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HKSBC), which takes the largest portion of
the local deposit base (34.7% in 1986) (2), seeking new
sources of fund is of major consideration to the rest of
mortgagees, especially deposit-taking companies and
commercial banks.
Basically, there are five sources of funds, i.e. equity
capital, loan capital from abroad, public deposits,
certificates of deposit and local inter-bank loans. Public
deposits accounted for 24% of the total liabilities of all
local deposit-taking institutions and 17%.for local inter-
bank funds in 1987. These were short-term funds of
(1) According to "The Hong Kong Housing Society Annual
Report Oct.84 - Mar.86", the outstanding mortgage
receivable amounted to HK$ 480,590.
(2) The Monthly Digest of Statistics, December 1987.
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maturity less than one year. As the assets held by banks
are mainly of longer life, there may be assets-liabilities
matching problems. Apparently, some of the financial
institutions will recognize the need to securitize part of
their mortgage loans.
As mentioned before, mortgage-backed securities can
primarily be divided into two types, i.e. sale-structured
and debt-structured. Sale-structured MBS transfers the
pro-rata interest on the mortgage pool to the security
buyer and so the mortgage can be off the originator's
books. The originator's exposure to the property related
business is also reduced to achieve a good assets balance.
Therefore, the MBS can be treated as a asset-liabilities
matching tool. Debt-structured MBS are similar in nature
to conventional bonds. The security buyers have the
issuer's mortgage pool as collateral and unless the
issuer defaults, the buyers have no direct claim on the
pledged pool.
Besides, there are other considerations that will affect
the decision of local financial institutions in adopting
the idea of MBS. Special attention is drawn to the
following factors.
7.1.1 MORTGAGOR RELATIONSHIP
Many retail bankers contend that the securitization of a
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mortgage loan will ruin their relationship with the
mortgagor (borrower). The primary mortgage market actually
is a relationship business. The competitive environment
has minimized the difference between the terms offered by
different mortgagees. The mortgagor always approaches his
intimate banker first even if the interest spread offered
is 1/4 to 1/2 per cent higher than the lowest spread
offered in the market. Some mortgagors may be unhappy if
the mortgage right is assigned to someone unknown. to them
through securitization.
However, this kind of worry is unjustified because the
administration of the mortgage loan still remains on the
shoulders of the debt-originator even if it is sold off
The mortgagor will still be served by the debt originator
and he will collect the interest and repayment for the MBS
holders. Perhaps, the mortgagor need not be informed about
the secondary transactions if a non-disclosure assignment
right is authorized to the originator.
7.1.2 IMPROVEMENT IN RETURN ON EQUITY RATIO
If a bank has expertise in mortgage loan origination,
selling off its mortgage assets has twofold advantages.
Firstly, the funds raised by this measure can be
reinvested into the mortgage business. By scale of economy
the costs of operations such as advertising and retailing
overhead can then be reduced. A higher return is thus
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achieved. Secondly, securitization can support a larger
volume of business without requiring an additional
injection of capital. As mortgage lending has a higher
profit margin than other kinds of loans and advances, the
return on equity ratio (ROE) can be improved.
7.1.3 INCREASE OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIO REQUIREMENT
The minimum capital adequacy ratio requirement is enforced
by the Banking Ordinance of Hong Kong as a prudential
supervision. According to Mr. Tony Nicolle, the
Commissioner of Banking, Hong Kong is scheduled to
introduce a minimum capital adequacy ratio of five per
cent from September 1988. However, in December 1987, the
international agreement by central bankers of the major
industrialized countries in Basle was declared requiring
banks to maintain the capital adequacy ratio at a minimum
of eight per cent. Though Hongkong was not a member of the
Basle group which signed this agreement, the Commissioner
hinted that Hongkong should follow the international
standard
This extra three per cent increase, if enforced, means
institutions would have to come up with roughly an extra
$95 billion in capital with respect to the total assets of
$3,155 billion of banks and deposit-taking companies in.
1987.
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Reducing assets and increasing capital would be the only
two ways to meet the new ratio. However, it is impossible
for local Chinese banks of small to medium sizes to source
additional funds solely from the equity market. On the
other hand, mortgage loans on average constitutes 15% of
the banks' total loans and advances for use in Hongkong,
and 39% for deposit-taking companies in 1987. Thus, these
financial institutions are cautious to truncate a chunk of
their business. The former course of action is therefore a
feasible but unwelcomed alternative to these institutions
as well as to those foreign banks which fail to seek
capital from their parent corporations to solve the
confronting problem.
Nevertheless, the skepticism of local bankers to MBS would
be reduced because the use of MBS has the merit that the
loan origination operation should not be curtailed.
Hence, this change has a positive effect on the surge of
MBS in Hong Kong.
7.1.4 HIGH BANK DEPOSITS TO ADVANCES RATIO
The funding the of local banking sector is mainly from the
deposits received. In 1987, local deposits accounted for
26.3% of the total liabilities of banks and 12.6% for
DTC(3). As the surplus of funding has been positive since.
1980, a huge portion is accumulated causing the deposit to
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advances ratio to increase from 64.5% in 1981 to 125.7% in
1986 (4). This increasing ratio reflects that the local
banking sector has held an excess of funds. Hence,
sourcing funds cannot be the primary motive for the banks
to issue mortgage-backed securities.
EXHIBIT 7.1:











Source: The Monthly Digest of Statistics, December 1987.
However, this ratio compares only the aggregate supply and
demand of loans. By the end of 1987, Hong Kong had 425
deposit-taking institutions. The local deposit base is
mainly shared by several large local banks with an
extensive retail network. For example, the HKSBC grasped
(3) The Monthly Digest of Statistics, December 1987
(4) Ibid.
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34.7% of the total deposits in 1986. This means that not
every bank can obtain adequate deposits for the
development of its lending business. Some small Chinese
banks, foreign banks and deposit-taking companies which
share only a small portion of the deposit base are still
searching for alternative sources of funds. The upsurge of
certificates of deposit demonstrates a great demand for an
effective money market instrument to channel the excess
funds to the deficit spending units. This high ratio also
demonstrates the problem in matching medium-term loans
(assets) with short-term deposits (liabilities).
7.1.5 HIGH LIQUID ASSET RATIO
The Hong Kong Banking Ordinance has a minimum liquid asset
ratio requirement of 25%. This ratio directly affects the
lending ability of banks registered in Hong Kong. However,
for the period from 1979 to 1986, the average liquid asset
ratio of local banking industry was held above 45%. It
seems that the great difference between this and the
statutory requirement enable the banks to cope with a
considerable increase in the demand for mortgage loans
simply by reducing their liquid assets. As discussed, this
higher than required liquid asset ratio is partly due to
the problem of a lack of long-term funds. In other words,
banks cannot cut down this ratio easily even if they
conform to the statutory requirement.
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7.2 GOVERNMENT AGENCY
The housing policy of the Hong Kong Government is
implemented by the Housing Authority. This Authority is
providing housing to the low income families on a rental
basis. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Authority has
had an aggressive long term project, the Home Ownership
Scheme (HOS), to match with Government's .housing
objectives. This scheme encourages the residents of public
rental housing to buy their own houses so that the rental
units can be released to the more needy who have long been
queuing up for public housing.
On the other hand, the Authority has just commenced a
subsidy program for those HOS home-buyers. They can apply
for an interest-free loan for up to HK$70,000 to help them
make a mortgage loan. The provision is that,the applicant
has to finalize the covenant with his banker first. The
banker is invited to administer this loan for the
Authority.
This recent measure implies the Authority's recognition of
the success of the HOS to induce a great demand for
mortgages. Therefore, providing low-interest-rate mortgage
loans is not only a social subsidy but also an effective
measure to complement the work of the HOS. It is
foreseeable that the Authority may enlarge the current
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mortgage loan programme if it is successful.
Notwithstanding, funding is a major' impediment to this
development as the Authority's financing is under the
budget of the Government.
In 1987, the Government made a thorough review of the
future role of the Housing Authority. An ad-hoc committee
was also formed to study the feasibility of separating the
Authority from the Government so that it would become
self-financing. If this is the case, it is obvious that
mortgage securitization is an alternative in addition to
other means of funding such as syndication and commercial
papers to the privatised Housing Authority.
7.3 BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS
More and more private housing projects have been completed
in recent years. If the developer can offer a lower-
interest mortgage loan, it will be an attractive attribute
to the potential home buyer. Financially sound builders
and developers have higher creditability and accessibility
to the capital market than small home purchasers.
Therefore, they can obtain cheap funds directly from the
capital market to fund those mortgage loans. As a result,
the marketability of their housing projects can surely be
enhanced.
Actually, before the last down-turn of the local property
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market, many property companies had subsidiaries in the
form of finance companies to arrange mortgages for their
housing projects. Those finance companies would make a
sub-mortgage agreement with banks to source funds. The
principle behind this procedure is similar to the MBS but
the difference is that this method channels funds from the
lending market instead of the capital market.
However, developers are not willing to operate this kind
of finance company now. The current spread of mortgage
loans is so thin that it is not a profitable business to a
company that lacks expertise in debt origination and
administration. Meanwhile, the competition among banks in
the mortgage business is keen. This has forced the banks
to agree with large developers on offering favorable terms
to home purchasers. As a result, there is no need for the
developers to arrange mortgages themselves to boost the
sales of their development projects.
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CHAPTER 8
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ACCEPTABILITY OF MBS
In the foregoing discussion, the supply side of mortgage-
backed security is examined with regards to three
different kinds of prospective issuers. There are
foreseeable technical problems in issuing MBS in Hong
Kong. Attention is drawn specifically to four areas, which
are the off-book structure, documentation, guarantee and
costing.
In order to assess the acceptability of this money market
instrument by the investors, the major concerns of the
investors must be delineated first. There are at least
seven major considerations in choosing an investment in
the capital market they are as follows:
1. the denomination of the instrument issued
2. the marketability and liquidity of the issue
3. the safety or the susceptibility to default risk
of the issue
4. the means of paying the principal and interest of
the issue
5. the expected average loan life or maturity of the
issue
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6. the tax status of the issue
7. the relative yield of the issue
With reference to these concerns, the local capital market
was investigated. As local mortgage loans are all in local
currency, the analysis is limited to the Hongkong dollar
instruments in the market. Since Hong Kong's domestic
capital market had its inception some five years ago, it
is assumed that it would not achieve a great depth and
maturity within such a short period of time. The Hong Kong
capital market still has room for structural progress if
it is to become an integral part of the local financial
system.
8.1 HOW TO GET THE MORTGAGE OFF THE ORIGINATOR'S
BOOKS- SPV
In the United Kingdom, the securitization techniques
practiced are of more relevance to Hong Kong than those in
the US. This is due to the different extent of
governmental influences in the housing markets. In the US,
securitization has been undertaken by the government
agency, GNMA, whereas the principal means in the UK has
been the use of Special Purpose Vehicles, SPV.
Since there are no intermediaries for mortgage-backed.
securities issued in the UK, a SPV is formed by the loan
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originator itself so that the consolidation of the loan in
the originator's account is avoided. The SPV is a company
performing the MBS issuer's functions. It acquires the
mortgage pool from the originator and funds them with the
money raised through selling MBS. Also, the SPV as an
issuer is responsible for reinvestment management and the
distribution of the proceeds.
The ownership and operation of the Special Purpose Vehicle
can be flexibly designed to achieve the primary objective
that sells the mortgages off the book. However, there may
be a conflict of interest if the servicer, issuer and
trustee of a mortgage-backed security are not kept
distinct from one another.
EXHIBIT 8.1













Theoretically, the function of the trustee is to supervise
the conduct of the issuer and servicer on behalf of the
MBS investors. As depicted in Exhibit 8.1, the repayment
of mortgages is collected and administered by the
servicer. No matter what type the MBS is, it is logical
that the mortgage originator would act as the servicer
because of its expertise and for the sake of convenience.
In order to protect the investor, the issuer of the SPV
cannot undertake any other activities, such as merging,
having any subsidiaries or paying any dividends before
their obligations have been discharged.
8.2 DOCUMENTATION
The local merchant bankers are positive to mortgage
securitization with some reserve. One of the major
technical problems is that the prevailing mortgage
covenant has no clauses written for the assignment right
of the mortgagee. If the mortgage originator has to obtain
the agreement from the mortgagor for. the issuance and
every transaction of MBS, it would involve a great amount
of documentary effort and it would incur considerable
cost. This induces skepticism to the prospective issuer.
Therefore, it is vital for the original mortgagee to
retain title to the loan while the MBS investor is
assigned only the right to the flow of interest payments
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and principal. If a mortgagee or debt-originator decides
to undergo securitization, it is advised that clauses be
made to clear up the legal ambiguity for the new mortgage
loan. In the U.S., mortgagors are requested to authorize
an estoppel certificate for the mortgagee in the
origination process. This certificate permits the mortgage
to be passed away through anticipated secondary market
activities.
8.3 COSTING
The MBS issuer earns its return from the spread between
the price it pays for the loans it buys and the higher
price it receives for the securities. As shown in Exhibit
8.2, the mortgage rates over the prime rate in 1987 were
in the range of 1-1.25%.
The prime rate or the best-lending rate is a cartelised
interest rate set by the local note-issuing banks. Once it
is changed, other commercial banks and deposit-taking
companies follow suit. Unlike the foreign lending market,
the prime rate in Hong Kong cannot be adjusted to fully
reflect the demand-supply equilibrium of the local lending
market. Usually, it is higher than the prevailing money
market interest rate,' and these two rates would not move
at the same pace. Exhibit 8.3 shows the differential
between HK$ prime rate and 3-month HIBOR (Hong Kong Inter-
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EXHIBIT 8.2
COMPARISON OF SELECTED BANKS MORTGAGE RATES
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Bank Offered rate) for the years 1984-1987. The mean
differential is 1.24%.
Assuming the loan originator is willing to sell off its
mortgage pool for the margin over prime rate, then whether
this 1.24% differential is large enough to cover the
issuing costs and the risk premium required by investors
of MBS is a crucial question to the feasibility of MBS.
The costs of the MBS issuers mainly include five items,
i.e.
1. cost of purchasing loans
2. supervising the loan servicing operations
3. purchasing default and hazard insurance to protect
the MBS investor
4. advancing funds to cover payments on which
borrowers are delinquent, and
5. marketing the MBS to enhance its marketability in
the secondary market.
8.4 GUARANTEE
As discussed in Chapter 3, the success of GNMA's pass
through is tied in with the guarantee backed by the full
faith and credit of the U.S. government. The guarantee
assures investors that monthly payments generated from the
mortgages pass on to them through issuers on a timely
basis. In addition to the pledged mortgage, this guarantee
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permits the pass through investor to accept a lower spread
among other money market instruments. It is also the
reason why pass through can generally obtain a triple-A
rating.
Without the quasi-government agency status, private
issuers such as mortgage banks and mortgage companies have
to develop other guarantee facilities against losses
arising on the defaulted mortgage pool. Otherwise,
investors expect a higher spread for these securities and
this is unfavorable to the issuer. This problem is made
worse by the terms of the floating rate MBS. This issuer
will face a cashflow problem when the differential between
the prime rate and Hibor drops steeply down below average.
This is because the interest from the mortgage pool
excluding the administrative expenses cannot cover the
obligations of the MBS issuer. In order to protect
investors from this kind of risk, guarantee facilities are
required. Principally, there are two options for the
issuers to provide guarantee facilities.
First, the issuer can establish a PROTECTION FUND as a
memorandum account in its books. When part of the mortgage
pool defaults, the loss is booked to the issuer and the
securities investors can still have their principal
repaid. In other words, the issuer accepts a contingent
liability. This account should be limited to 10% of the
•issued securities' par value. Such a limit will be reduced
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by 5% of each amount of principal reduction in respect of
the mortgage pool.
Second, the issuer can purchase a mortgage pool INDEMNITY
POLICY from an insurance company to cover any losses
incurred as a result of defaults by borrowers on their
mortgage loans. Claims will be paid to the issuer. The
administration of the Mortgage Pool Indemnity Policy will
be carried out by the issuer. With the policy, the issuer
will not pass the default risk to the investor who brought
the securities. More than that, the policy can be
structured to cover also any losses arising from a
unfavorable interest scenario.
These two options, however, both involve costs. A totally
different approach to tackle this problem is by
collaterlised mortgage obligations (CMO) or Subordinated
Note Facility. With this, the mortgage repayment cash
flows are separated into different tranches (classes) of
security, with varying lives. The cash flows are used
initially to pay interest on each class, and then to
retire each class in order.
Usually, CMO consists of two tranches, namely, A B. The
tranche B will not be redeemed until the tranche A is
fully redeemed. In return, an additional margin above the
interest payable on the A tranche is offered to the
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tranche B investor. This method is based on the fact that
in a mature capital market, there must be both risk
aversers and risk takers. Risk takers are willing to
assume higher risks for higher returns. Therefore, the
risk averser prefers tranche A MBS because of the higher
redemption priority even without the additional margin.
8.5 FACTORS DISCOURAGING INVESTORS
The issuing activity of marketable securities has remained
relative stable even following the slump in the equity
market in October. In part, the Hong Kong dollar capital
market has been booming since 1985. Nevertheless,
participants in the market- mostly merchant banks-
conceded that the infrastructure supporting this boom was
fragile. There are five structural weaknesses impeding the
development of the market both on the borrowers' and
investors' sides.
8.5.1 Small and Narrow Investor Base
One of the local capital market's biggest weaknesses is
that most debt paper is held by financial institutions,
with little support coming from the corporate sector and
even less from individual investors. It is roughly
estimated that 65% of CDs issued in Hong Kong are now held
by deposit-taking institutions, 10% by high net worth
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individuals, 10% by companies, and 15% by pension funds
and insurance companies (1).
In the Territory, most insurance schemes are on the u.5.
dollar basis. This means U.S. dollars are needed in the
ultimate payout to the schemes' beneficiaries. Therefore,
insurance companies show little interest in the local
currency debt instruments because they are averse to
assume the exchange risk. However, insurance and pension
funds constitute a significant portion of the local
capital source. Now they are invested in the foreign
capital markets partly because of the exchange rate
consideration.
This imbalanced investor base definitely reduces the
liquidity of the market. The banks and institutional
investors are now buying those papers for holding-to-
maturity return. The secondary market is almost inactive.
The current trading is mainly fostered by some market-
makers who are appointed by the issuers. In theory,
investors would expect a higher interest return because
of the loss in liuidity.
The demand for Hongkong dollar debt instruments becomes
volatile because it is dominated by a single sector, the
(1) HK Dollar Capital Market Gains a Little More Depth
Hong Kong Bankers' Handbook 1986, p.53
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financial institutions. Hong Kong lacks the individual and
corporate investors which provide stable support for
other, more mature markets. Also, the capital market will
lose its effectiveness and efficiency in allocating
capital in the Territory when the investor base is narrow.
This is a vicious circle. Hong Kong's small investors,
with their penchant for fast action and quick gains, are
not willing to lock up their money in an instrument with
no secondary market. Ironically, a liquid secondary market
requires a wide investor base.
8.5.2 Lack of Local Government Debts
Unlike the foreign capital markets in Europe and the U.S.,
there are no treasury bills or notes in the local market.
So far, only several issues by the utilities are
guaranteed by the Hong Kong Government. As a result,
investors lack an easy reference for comparison of the
rates offered by other instruments issued in the market.
Currently, the HIBOR becomes a proxy of the reference
leading to the adjustment for an equilibrium between
capital demand and supply. By definition, the HIBOR is
applied only among financial institutions. Individual
investors cannot use this to estimate the opportunity cost
for their investment decisions.
8.5.3 No Credit Rating Agencies
In a mature market, investors not only need a rate
reference but also a credit rating agency. Credit rating
is a good guidance to investors, especially for those
individuals and companies which lack the resources to
assess the riskiness of capital market instruments. This
shortcoming accounts also for the narrow investor base
problem. However, it is obvious that as a business entity,
international credit rating agencies would not extend
their coverage to a market lacking secondary activities.
The situation is controversial because it is difficult for
a narrow-investor-based market to enhance its activities
without a rating system.
8.5.4 Tax
The Government levies either a withholding tax or profit
tax of 18% (2) on interest earned by investors who
purchase debt paper issued by financial concerns other
than banks. The local merchant banks, express
disapproval of this measure because the tax only applies
to Hongkong dollar borrowings. Because of this
discriminatory tax levy,' more and more papers are now
denominated in foreign currencies, usually in U.S.
(2) In March 1987, the profit tax was revised. It was cut
by 1% to 17% for the fiscal year 1988.
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dollars. Nevertheless, risk averse investors and borrowers
whose concerns are in Hongkong dollar. are unwilling to
assume the exchange risk. Though swap and other hedging
methods provide a means to reduce the exchange
uncertainty, these involve costs. Therefore, the current
tax structure prevents the further expansion of the market
in terms of depth and breadth alike.
8.5.5 SOME IMPORTANT LOCAL CAPITAL MARKET ACTIVITIES
A. Instruments are Becoming Sophisticated
In 1987, the market was flooded with a variety of
innovative new instruments. Before the October crash, the
community was covered with a speculative atmosphere. A
significant amount of funds were drained into the equity
market from the capital market. As a result, money market
participants endeavored to augment some speculative
features to their debt papers to reduce the leakage. For
example, gold-linked and currency-linked CDs, CDs with
minimax interest limits, stepping-up bonds and index-
linked bonds were issued during the second half of 1987.
The maturity value of these linked papers, mainly the CDs,
depends on the maturity index they link to. It seems that
the market progresses towards sophistication.
However, the market could hardly absorb these new issues.
Though these features were designed to attract those
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investors looking for capital gains in addition to the
expected interest, there is no evidence that the investor
base widened.
Since the investor base rests heavily on banks and
institutions, sophisticated features seem not to cause any
problems. And the market is not skeptical about innovative
debt instruments. At the time of writing this report, the
Ginnie Mae MBS is going to be introduced to Hongkong
investor by an American securities house. As the company
is not yet in operation, the acceptability of this
offshore MBS is still unknown.
B. Few Issues of Long Term Paper
Dominated by negotiable certificate of deposit (CD), the
market also has other money market instruments, floating
rate notes (FRNs), commercial papers (CPs) and bonds.
A CD's life usually ranges from three months to three
years. At present, the longest life of FRNs and bonds
issued in Hongkong dollar is ten years but there were only
two issues in 1986-87. The rest are mainly within three to
seven years. Experienced merchant bankers estimated that
over HK$ 19 billion was raised through the capital market
in Hong Kong in 1985. Of this, HK$ 11 billion worth of the
issues (58%) were CDs (3). Meanwhile, after the boom in
(3) "Hong Kona Banking System", T.K. Ghose
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1985, FRNs' issuance dwindled significantly. In 1987,
there was only one issue of HK$ 4 million. In contrast,
HK$ 3 billion worth FRNs were issued in the preceding year
The denominated maturity of MBS is probably longer than 12
years. The low preference of investors towards long life
debt papers hinders the development of the FRN and bond
markets. This may also be due to fact that investors
foresee low liquidity without an active secondary market.
C. Experience of the MTR's Step-up Bond
The Mass Transit Railway (MTR) bond was issued in February
1988 as the first bond issue aimed at small investors.
This is in denominations of HK$10,000, also the minimum
subscription. There are two choices for maturity, i.e.
five and seven years. The bonds have a step-up, or
graduated, interest-rate feature unique in Hong Kong. In
the recent low deposit rate scenario, though the bonds
were distributed through the widest retail bank's network,
the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, the
reaction was not encouraging.
It was intended to issue HK$500 millions worth of the
bonds but after the closing date for subscriptions, the
total subscription amounted to only $218 millions (43.6%).
About 20% of the subscribers asked for 70% of the total
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subscription which implies that the subscribers are mainly
large investors. Apparently, small investors lack interest
in long term fixed-rate debt paper (4).
D. The Honqkonq Capital Market Association
The Association, of which most players on the local
capital market are members, was formed to correct the
drawbacks of the market. The major step of the Association
to broaden the investor base is to negotiate with the
Government to relieve the discriminatory tax levy on
Hongkong dollar instruments.
Early in 1988, the Association has also proposed a tender
to the Government for the establishment of a central
clearing system of Hongkong dollar debt papers to improve
the settlement efficiency. Both these motions, if approved
by the Government, will certainly improve the structure of
the foundations of the local capital market. And a sound
foundation is of paramount importance for the market's
future development. This enhances the feasibility of
sophisticated money market instruments such as MBS.




It is a fact that the local capital market lacks secondary
trading activities. There are also some discouraging
factors that are impeding the birth of the secondary
mortgage business through issuing mortgage-backed
securities. This chapter will suggest some actions to the
prospective issuers to overcome the foreseeable road-
blocks. These suggestions are based on the foregoing
analysis of the current situation.
9.1 Mortgage-backed Floating Rate Note (FRN)
In the United States, many versatile innovations of
mortgage-backed instruments have been developed to cater
for different investors' preferences. Some of these
instruments are of less relevance to the local situation
because of their sophistication. Local investors are
inexperienced and lack the know-how in analyzing the
pricing of any MBS which are brand-new to them. As a
beginning, the first issue of a MBS has to be a plain
vanilla, otherwise investors would hesitate to place their
subscriptions. Since Pass-Through may involve some.
entitlement ambiguity, the mortgage-backed FRN is
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appropriate to be introduced first. The mortgage-bacxea
FRN, as explained in Chapter 3, is simply a conventional
bond with mortgage loans as collateral. The instrument is
secured with the right to the flow of interest payments
and outstanding principal of the mortgage pool. Therefore,
it is not too sophisticated, as the bond is a well known
debt instrument. Furthermore, the income stream of a
mortgage-backed FRN is more certain than that of a Pass-
Through which will be delayed if mortgagors default.
The instrument is suggested to be in form of a FRN. This
is simply because the outstanding mortgage loans are
floating rate mortgages in local currency. If the MBS is
not a Hongkong dollar FRN, the interest rate risk and the
exchange risk must be assumed and thus the pricing method
is made more complicated.
9.2 Indemnity Policy- Guarantee
As a guarantee facility, the Subordinated Note works only
when there is a wide investor base and a spectrum of risk
preference. Therefore, it is not applicable in the
prevailing situation. An indemnity policy facility is
preferred because the insurance company, as a third party,
could objectively assess the instrument before making its
commitment. The investor can release part of the
assessment responsibility to this guarantor. And the
investor will be more confident of the quarantor's
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prudence. Of course, the cost is higher to the issuer in
return for the higher marketability of the issue.
9.3 Homogeneity of the Mortgage Pool
In order to make it easier for investors or guarantors to
assess the mortgage pool, the range of significant loan
characteristics in the pool should be limited. It is more
appropriate to confine the pool to home mortgages because
their lives are more consistent and the default rate is
low. Though Hong Kong is geographically small, the value
of properties varies greatly among different districts and
locations. There should be some limits on the value of the
properties that will be built into the pool. The
creditability of the mortgagor and the default risk are
related to the classes of the collateral. The more
consistent the characteristics of the mortgage in the
collateral pool, the easier it is for the investor the
assess the price of the issue.
9.4 Private Placement
Currently, there are three distribution techniques for the
primary sale of money market instruments. They are,
namely, auctions, private placements and public offerings
through branches of cooperating banks. From the experience
of the MTR's Step-up bonds, the public offering is not
effective as the general small investors are not well
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prepared to take part in the money market. On the other
hand, the first issuance of a MBS will unquestionably be
targeted on the institutional investors because of its
sophistication. Sale by auction can obtain a more
favorable price than sale by private placement. However,
investors have to be familiar with the instrument under
auction so that they can bid with informed judgment. It is
more convenient to distribute the issue by private
placement.
Usually, investment banks would like to arrange and to
underwrite the placement for the issuer. Since these
competent underwriters have a wide clientele and
connections with institutional investors, the distribution
will be more effective.
Meanwhile, the underwriter can be appointed as the market-
maker also to enhance the liquidity of the MBS as well as
its marketability. Though the current practice is that
investors are buying debt instruments with the intention
of holding them to maturity, a provision for repurchase
will be very attractive to any reluctant investors.
9.5 Clarification of Legal Procedures
Legal advice is required concerning the capacity of the
mortgagee. Can the prevailing mortgage covenant allow the
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mortgagee to undertake secondary mortgage activities with
the underlying collateral? The answer must be determined
first for the future development of the secondary mortgage
business. If the answer is negative, the cost and benefit
of estoppel certificates should be studied as these are
used to solve this problem in the United States.
9.6 Fstahlishina a Clearing House Corporation
It is plausible that the secondary trading of money market
instruments can be facilitated by establishing a clearing
house. The Clearing House has four primary functions to
assist the progress of the market's development:
(i) provides a market-place for secondary trading of
local debt instruments so that the cost incurred
in searching for buyers or sellers can be reduced;
(ii) standardizes the instruments as much as possible
so that the operating efficiency of the market can
be improved;
(iii) acts as a quality control unit, and to some
extent, provides investment guidelines to the
investors;
(iv) promotes the market in order to widen the investor
base.
In addition to these, the Clearing House can also provide
guarantees attached to certain kinds of instruments, for
example, mortgage-backed instruments. With the guarantees,
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investors will be more willing to participate in the
market. However, the Clearing House is a long-term plan





Theoretically, the securitization of debt would generate
at least two important benefits. First, securities are
more readily transferable from one creditor to another
than a pure loan. This will induce investors to accept a
somewhat lower return from the securities. Thus, the
illiquidity premium carried by pure loans would be
diminished. Second, in a well-functioning secondary
market, securities can be placed with a wider range of
investors. Traditionally, debts are solely held by a
relatively small number of larger banks. If the ownership
of debts can be diversified, the concentration premium
will not be charged because the supply of lending money is
enlarged.
In sum, securitization is a cheaper way for the borrower
to obtain funds, i.e. the benefiaries of MBS are the home
purchasers, especially the middle income households which
cannot enjoy the government subsidies. And it is also the
major role of the finance industry. Its objective is to
direct funds from surplus-entities towards deficits-
entities so that capital can be allocated efficiently to
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improve the general economy.
In the United States, the secondary mortgage market
performs five positive economic functions. As mentioned,
these are (a) providing liquidity to the mortgage loan;
(b) moderating the volatility of mortgage capital flow;
(c) directing funds between different areas; (d) directing
funds from abroad (e) reducing the geographical
differences in interest rate. In this Study, it is found
that these functions are not all relevant to Hong Kong
because of some structural differences.
The basic difference between the mortgage markets of Hong
Kong and the United States is the geographical coverage.
Hong Kong is just a city and it does not confront any
problems concerning funds flow within the area. Moreover,
it is easier for Hong Kong to access overseas fund than
the smaller States in the North America. In addition, the
housing policy of the two governments are not the same.
The Government of the United States encourages her
citizens to own their own houses whereas rental public
housing is provided in Hong Kong. Therefore, government
agencies which established the secondary mortgage business
in the United States are absent in Hong Kong.
Nevertheless, the Home Ownership Scheme indicates a change
of priorities of the Hong Kong Government.
In spite of these differences, the secondary mortgage
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business is still desirable to Hong Kong as it can improve
the liquidity of the loan market. The motives encouraging
the prospective issuer to undertake this business are that
(a) controlling its exposure to mortgage lending and (b)
seeking funds to cope with the foreseeable growth of the
mortaaae market.
From the study, it seems plausible that the local capital
market is too fragile for the inception of sophisticated
MBS. However, when the motives induce significant
impetus, the securitization of mortgage loans becomes
feasible despite the mentioned technical impediments.
Recommendations are suggested for the prospective issuers'
reference.
Hong Kong has no central authority like the Federal
Reserve Board in the United States to account for monetary
control. The best lending rate of Hong Kong has been used
to regulate the valuation of local currency. Hence, the
prime rate is not adjusted with respect to the local
lending market. Therefore, the market is not fully self-
regulating for the equilibrium between demand and supply.
An efficiently integrated financial system is a premise
for Hong Kong's future development. It is believed that
when the local capital market develops further, mortgage-
backed securities will play a major role in integratinc
the lending market and the capital market.
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